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International Sale of Goods
By Gregory M. Duhl*
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, U.S. courts analyzed the scope, formation, and remedies provisions
of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (“CISG”).1 Although the number of cases arising under the CISG is rela-
tively small compared to those under the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”),
the cases discussed in this survey remind us that U.S. courts are comfortable in
applying the CISG. A comprehensive survey setting forth legal developments in
the United States during the past nine years involving the CISG follows the Uni-
form Commercial Code Survey in this issue of The Business Lawyer.2 That survey
illustrates that the comfort of the U.S. courts with the CISG in the last calendar
year was no aberration.
SCOPE
The CISG generally applies to non-consumer contracts for the sale of goods
where the parties are in different contracting States.3 Two common questions
that arise with regard to the CISG are whether it covers distributorships and
how parties opt out of the CISG for a contract otherwise within its scope.4
* Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. I thank Joseph Dun-
ham and Chelsea Sommers for their excellent research and editorial assistance.
1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,
1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html [here-
inafter CISG].
2. Ann Morales Olazábal, Robert W. Emerson, Karen D. Turner & René Sacasas, Global Sales Law:
An Analysis of Recent CISG Precedents in U.S. Courts 2004–2012, 67 BUS. LAW. ____ (2012).
3. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 1(1)(a), 2(a).
4. Three inconsequential scope cases were decided in 2011: two dealt with the non-application of
the CISG between two U.S. parties. See Gibraltar Trading Corp. v. PMC Specialties Grp., Inc., No. 10
CV 3966(SJ)(MDG), 2011 WL 3625332 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011) (granting motion to remand the
case to New York state court, as both parties were U.S. companies and therefore the CISG did not
apply and there was no federal diversity jurisdiction); Gibraltar Trading Corp. v. PMC Specialties
Grp., Inc., No. CV 2010-3966(SJ)(MDG), 2011 WL 3625363 (E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) (according
preclusive effect to determination that federal district court in Ohio could not apply the CISG and
recommending transfer of case to that court). In the third case, the court held that an aggressive prayer
for relief in a CISG action was not a ground for dismissal on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion. See
Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding that, even though the plaintiff was unlikely to recover the full contract price, the lower
1
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DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENTS
In Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc.,5 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland decided that the CISG does not apply to a dis-
tributorship agreement. Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. (“G.E.I.”), an Italian
corporation, and Aromi D’Italia, Inc. (“A.D.I.”), a Maryland corporation, entered
into a distributorship agreement under which A.D.I. was the exclusive distributor
of G.E.I.’s gelato in the United States (the “Agreement”).6 The Agreement allowed
G.E.I. to terminate the Agreement without notice if A.D.I. did not pay invoices
when due.7 A.D.I. failed to pay numerous invoices.8 However, G.E.I. did not ex-
ercise its termination right under the Agreement.9 Instead, the parties tried to
negotiate a resolution to the unpaid invoices, while G.E.I. allowed A.D.I. to con-
tinue as its exclusive U.S. distributor.10 The negotiations failed, and G.E.I. even-
tually terminated the Agreement.11 G.E.I. then sued A.D.I. for, inter alia, breach
of the Agreement.12
The court noted that the CISG applies to “contracts of sale of goods between
parties whose places of business are in different States.”13 The issue was whether
the Agreement was a contract for the sale of goods under the CISG. Under the
U.C.C., distributorship agreements are typically contracts for the sale of goods.14
However, the courts that have considered this issue under the CISG have concluded
that a distributorship agreement is not within the CISG’s scope.15 This court agreed
and supported its reasoning with reference to Article 14 of the CISG.16 Article 14
states that a proposal for a contract is not an offer unless it contains sufficiently de-
finite terms for determining the price and quantity of the goods.17 Since the Agree-
ment did not contain price and quantity terms, it was not a sufficiently definite
contract under the CISG.18
court should not have dismissed because plaintiff “[was] almost certain to be entitled to some mone-
tary relief ”).
5. Civil No. CCB-08-65, 2011 WL 3207555 (D. Md. July 27, 2011).




10. Id. at *1–2.
11. Id. at *2.
12. Id. at *1.
13. Id. at *3 (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(a)) (emphasis omitted).
14. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2–106(1) (2011); Kirby v. Chrysler Corp., 554 F. Supp. 743, 749–50
(D. Md. 1982); Cavalier Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 454 A.2d 367, 376 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1983)); see also Santa Fe Custom Shutters & Doors, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
113 P.3d 347, 358 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (“The facts that the contract imposed [on] SFCS a duty to
maintain sufficient capacity to meet Home Depot’s needs and imposed on Home Depot a duty to mar-
ket SFCS’s goods and services to Home Depot’s customers does not take the contract out of Article 2.”).
15. Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A., 2011 WL 3207555, at *3 (citing Amco Ukrservice v. Am.
Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686–87 (E.D. Pa. 2004)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing CISG, supra note 1, art. 14(1)).
18. Id.
2 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 67, August 2012
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DISCLAIMING APPLICATION OF THE CISG
In Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chemical Co.,19 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether the parties’
agreement had displaced provisions of the CISG. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc.
(“Cedar”), a New York-based petrochemicals trader, alleged that Dongbu Han-
nong Chemical Company, Ltd. (“Dongbu”), a South Korean company in the
same business, delivered non-conforming liquid phenol, in violation of written
and oral contracts, and in contravention of its duties under the CISG.20 On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties put forward the following ar-
guments: Dongbu argued that the parties’ contract displaced the provisions of
the CISG under which Cedar brought its action.21 Cedar countered that the phe-
nol was corrupted prior to delivery, and Dongbu violated its obligations under
the CISG.22 The court denied both motions.23
The parties’ contract required Dongbu to deliver a load of phenol to the Port
of Ulsan, South Korea, where Cedar would take possession.24 The delivery term
was F.O.B. Ulsan, South Korea.25 The contract provided for an independent in-
spection of the phenol that was to be binding on both parties.26 Finally, it pro-
vided that the phenol’s color specification was not to exceed ten Hazen units.27
When the phenol arrived, multiple samples were drawn for testing.28 One set
was drawn for contemporaneous testing (the “First Set”) and one was retained
for later testing, should quality issues arise (the “Second Set”).29 The First Set
was on-specification, and Cedar accepted the shipment.30 However, when the
phenol arrived at its destination, tests revealed that it was widely off-specification,
at 500 Hazen units.31 This led to a test of the Second Set, which was also off-
specification.32
Cedar alleged breaches of two separate CISG articles. First, Cedar argued,
Dongbu breached Article 35, which requires goods be fit for their ordinary pur-
pose and any particular purpose “expressly or impliedly made known to the
seller.”33 Second, it argued that Article 36 imposes liability on a seller for defects
present before the risk transfers to the buyer, “even though the lack of confor-
mity becomes apparent only after that time.”34 Dongbu countered by arguing
19. No. 06 Civ. 3972(LTS)(JCF), 2011 WL 4494602 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011).







27. Id. This is a scientific measure based on the Platinum-Cobalt Scale. Id.
28. Id. at *2, *5.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *2.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 35).
34. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 36).
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that, because the terms of the contract had displaced the duties imposed by the
CISG, it only had to provide phenol that was conforming at the time of
delivery.35
Dongbu’s argument was based on three contractual terms: (1) the F.O.B. term,
(2) the term providing for independent inspection, and (3) a merger clause.36
The court correctly held that none of these clauses expressly disclaimed applica-
tion of the CISG.37 As to the F.O.B. term, the court reasoned that, because the
CISG expressly incorporates Incoterms, and because F.O.B. is an Incoterm, an
F.O.B. term does not displace the CISG.38 Moreover, the court noted that
F.O.B. is compatible with Article 36.39 Article 36 confirms that the decisive
question is which party bore the risk of loss when the injury occurred, and
not when it manifested itself.40
Dongbu did not provide an explanation for its second argument, and the court
rejected it.41 Finally, Dongbu argued that the merger clause prevented Cedar
from introducing two pieces of extrinsic evidence: (1) that the color specification
was a material term because Dongbu knew that Cedar’s downstream customer
required phenol with a twenty Hazen maximum; and (2) that the ordinary trade
usage of phenol would support the contract’s Hazen requirement.42 The court
rejected both contentions, noting that Article 8 “commands courts to consider ex-
trinsic evidence that illuminates the parties’ intent.”43 Moreover, Article 9, which
permits the introduction of evidence of common international trade practices,
would have allowed the introduction of evidence that Dongbu knew or should
have known that, under international trade practices, phenol is unfit for ordinary
usage if it degrades before reaching its final destination.44 This is because a mer-
ger clause only covers the agreements and understandings of parties in regard to
a particular contract, and not trade usages.45 Therefore, the court denied Dong-
bu’s summary judgment motion, noting Cedar could introduce extrinsic evi-
dence concerning the parties’ intent and trade usage.46 The court, however,
could have addressed the issues raised by Dongbu’s motion more directly, noting
that the parties did not explicitly opt out of the CISG through a well-drafted
choice-of-law clause, and therefore the CISG applied.47
35. Id.
36. Id. at *3.
37. See id.
38. Id. at *4. The International Chamber of Commerce periodically provides a glossary of interna-
tional commerce terms (Incoterms) that parties frequently incorporate into their international sales
contracts. See id. at *3.
39. Id. at *4.
40. Id.
41. Id.





47. See, e.g., Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149−50 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (“Defendant asserts that merely choosing the law of a jurisdiction is insufficient to opt out
of the CISG, absent express exclusion of the CISG. The Court finds that the particular choice of
4 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 67, August 2012
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The court also denied Cedar’s summary judgment motion, but on purely fac-
tual grounds.48 Cedar argued that the evidence conclusively established that the
phenol was damaged prior to being loaded onto the ship at the Port of Ulsan.49
Dongbu disputed this vigorously, presenting conflicting evidence and argu-
ments.50 Therefore, because neither party could conclusively establish when
the phenol was damaged, such a determination was inappropriate on summary
judgment.51
FORMATION AND RESERVATION UNDER THE CISG
Two recent cases addressed problems of contract formation and reservation that
arose after the parties formed and executed a number of contracts.
CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Electronics, GmbH52 is a classic “battle of
the forms” case, decided by the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.
CSS Antenna, Inc. (“CSS”), a Maryland corporation, and Amphenol-Tuchel Elec-
tronics, GmbH (“A.T.E.”), a German corporation, entered into a series of con-
tracts for A.T.E. to supply CSS with cables and accessories for CSS’s cellular
towers.53 In late 2004, CSS began sending successive purchase orders to A.T.E.
for cell-tower components.54 A.T.E. would respond to each purchase order
with a confirmation form sent to CSS’s billing department.55 The parties
would then perform.56 In April 2005, the parties entered into an Inventory
and Supply Agreement.57 Despite the new agreement, the parties continued to
conduct business under the old pattern: purchase order, purchase confirmation,
and performance.58
When A.T.E.’s components began malfunctioning, CSS filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland.59 CSS alleged breach of various con-
tractual and implied warranties.60 A.T.E. moved to dismiss, arguing that a forum
selection clause, contained in its General Conditions for the Supply of Products
and Services of the Electrical and Electronics Industry (the “General Condi-
tions”), required the dispute to be brought in the district of A.T.E.’s place of
law provisions in the ‘Terms and Conditions’ of both parties are inadequate to effectuate an opt out of
the CISG.”); Thomas J. Drago & Alan F. Zoccolillo, Be Explicit: Drafting Choice of Law Clauses in Inter-
national Sale of Goods Contracts, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2002, at 9, available at http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/zoccolillo1.html#18.
48. Cedar Petrochemicals, 2011 WL 4494602, at *5−6.
49. Id. at *5.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *6.
52. 764 F. Supp. 2d 745 (D. Md. 2011).
53. Id. at 747–48.
54. Id. at 747.
55. Id. at 747−48.




60. Id. at 747−48.
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business.61 Although these General Conditions were not included in the pur-
chase confirmations that A.T.E. sent CSS, A.T.E. argued that they were still
part of the contract because the purchase confirmations made general reference
to them.62 CSS countered that it did not know about the General Conditions and
never agreed to any of the terms therein, including the forum selection clause.63
The court first laid out the general CISG principles: Under the CISG, “[a] reply
to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations
or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer.”64
If, however, the additional or different terms in the purported acceptance do not
materially alter the offer, and if the offeror fails to object without undue delay, a
contract is formed that includes the additional or different terms.65 The CISG pro-
vides examples of terms that materially alter an offer: price, payment, quality and
quantity, place and time of delivery, extent of one party’s liability, and the settle-
ment of disputes.66
The court held that A.T.E.’s purchase confirmation materially altered CSS’s
purchase order.67 This is because it referenced the General Conditions, which
contained the forum selection clause, a term concerning the “settlement of dis-
putes.”68 Thus, the purchase confirmation became a counteroffer. A.T.E. argued
that CSS accepted its counteroffer, and thus its forum selection clause, by per-
forming under the contract.69 CSS cited two cases70 for the proposition that
the forum selection clause did not become part of the contract because CSS
did not affirmatively assent to it.71 Both cases had similar circumstances—a pur-
chase order followed by a purchase confirmation with additional or different
terms.72 The court distinguished those two cases from the present case, however,
because in those two cases, prior to the purchase order, the parties had formed
an oral contract.73 Thus, when the sellers sent a purchase confirmation with ad-
ditional or different terms, it was an offer to modify the oral contract, which
under the CISG requires the affirmative assent of the other party.74 In this
case, A.T.E.’s purchase order was deemed to be a counteroffer, not a proposal
to modify.75 However, the court added, “[w]hether the language in ATE’s pur-
61. Id. at 751.
62. Id. at 752.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 19(1)).
65. Id. (citing CISG, supra note 1, art. 19(2)).
66. Id. (citing CISG, supra note 1, art. 19(3)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 752−53.
70. Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2003);
Solae, LLC v. Hershey Can., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457−58 (D. Del. 2008).
71. CSS Antenna, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing CISG, supra note 1, art. 29(1)).
75. Id.
6 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 67, August 2012
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chase confirmation form was sufficient to put CSS on notice that ATE intended
the General Conditions to apply . . . is a separate question.”76
Ultimately, under the CISG, whether the forum selection clause was part of
the contract hinged on the parties’ intent. Article 8 states: “For the purposes
of this Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be
interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not
have been unaware what that intent was.”77 A party’s statements are to be inter-
preted according to the understanding of a reasonable person, and “[i]n deter-
mining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would
have had, due consideration is given to all relevant circumstances of the case in-
cluding the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established be-
tween themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.”78
Two facts convinced the court that CSS did not know, and could not have
known, that A.T.E. intended the General Conditions to apply to the contract.
First, the purchase confirmation merely stated: “may we point out” that the Gen-
eral Conditions also applied.79 This was ambiguous at best.80 A more explicit
reference to the General Conditions was required to provide CSS with notice
that A.T.E. intended for them to be included.81 Second, the court held that
CSS did not have actual knowledge of the General Conditions.82 This is because
the purchase confirmation was sent to CSS’s billing department, where there was
no one with the authority to enter into, modify, or otherwise accept contracts.83
Therefore, because CSS did not know, and could not have known, of A.T.E.’s
intent to have the General Conditions become a part of the contract, they
were not included, and the forum selection clause could not prevent CSS
from filing suit in the District of Maryland.84
Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc.,85 decided by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, is similar to CSS Antenna, Inc. in
that numerous, distinct contracts were entered into with purchase orders and
confirmations. From January 2003 to April 2009, Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc.
(“Cedar”), a New York corporation, and Hanwha Corporation (“Hanwha”), a
Korean corporation, entered into twenty discrete transactions for the purchase
and sale of various petrochemicals.86 First, Hanwha would submit a bid to
Cedar for a given petrochemical at a given quantity and price.87 Cedar would
accept, forming what the parties said was a “firm bid.”88 Cedar would then
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1)).
78. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2)–(3)).






85. 760 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
86. Id. at 428.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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send various contract documents to finalize the terms of the contract.89 Those
documents always contained two items: (1) a “contract sheet” that embodied
the terms of the “firm bid” and a choice of law to govern the contract; and (2) a
set of “standard” terms and conditions, incorporated by reference into the contract
sheet.90 The choice of law was always New York law, the U.C.C., and Incoterms
2000.91 Hanwha would usually sign and return those documents.92 On three occa-
sions, Hanwha modified the choice of law before sending the documents back.93
Cedar did not object to any of those modifications.94
What precipitated the litigation was an attempt at a twenty-first contract. Han-
wha sent a bid that Cedar accepted, e-mailing its usual contract documents to
Hanwha.95 Cedar’s documents, as usual, stated that New York law, the U.C.C.,
and Incoterms 2000 governed the contract.96 Hanwha responded by signing the
documents, albeit with a revision that replaced Cedar’s choice of law with Singa-
pore law and Incoterms 2000.97 Hanwha then sent the signed, modified docu-
ments via e-mail, expressly stating that no contract would “enter into force” unless
Cedar countersigned Hanwha’s revised contract.98 Cedar refused to accept the
revisions, and insisted that a contract would be formed only if Hanwha accepted
Cedar’s original terms.99 Neither party relented, and Cedar never delivered the
petrochemicals.100 Hanwha sued for breach of contract.101
The first issue requiring a decision was the choice of law that governed the
dispute. The court held that the CISG governed because, while each party at-
tempted to contract out of the CISG, the parties could not agree on the alterna-
tive applicable law.102 Additionally, the parties could not opt out of the CISG
without explicitly indicating that the CISG did not apply.103
The next issue was whether Hanwha made a binding offer when it sent its in-
itial bid to Cedar. The court held that the bid was a “sufficiently definite” offer
under CISG Article 14(1) because it contained details regarding a specific pro-
duct, price, and quantity.104 Despite this binding offer, no contract was ever
formed because Article 14 requires that the parties intend to be bound, and Han-






94. Id. at 428–29.






101. Id. at 429−30.
102. Id. at 431.
103. See id.; see also supra note 47.
104. Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
105. Id.
8 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 67, August 2012
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ings, neither party intended to be bound until the contract documents Cedar
sent to Hanwha were finalized.106
Because the parties did not intend to be bound by the bid and bid acceptance,
the court next discussed the parties’ exchanges relating to the final contract docu-
ments.107 Here, the court held that the parties never intended to form a con-
tract.108 This is because Hanwha’s response, striking Cedar’s choice of law in
favor of its own, expressly stated that Cedar had to assent affirmatively in order
to form a contract.109 Plus, Cedar rejected Hanwha’s change outright, further in-
dicating that neither party intended to be bound.110 Therefore, Cedar was not in
breach of contract when it chose not to deliver the petrochemicals.111
REMEDIES
In the past year, remedies cases under the CISG involved damages for contract
avoidance, a limitations-of-remedies clause, lost profits, recovery of prejudgment
interest, and unjust enrichment.
CONTRACT AVOIDANCE
In Semi-Materials Co. v. MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc.,112 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri interpreted CISG damages provisions.
Semi-Materials Co., Ltd. (“Semi-Materials”) alleged that certain actions of MEMC
Electronic Materials, Inc. and MEMC Pasadena, Inc. (collectively, “MEMC”) con-
stituted fraud and breach of contract, for which compensatory and punitive da-
mages were owed.113 Semi-Materials sought to introduce expert testimony for
calculating damages.114 MEMC moved to exclude the testimony, arguing that
it was legally impermissible, based on the expert’s application of CISG Article
76 instead of CISG Article 74.115
Under the CISG, “[i]f the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under
the contract or this Convention, the buyer may . . . claim damages as provided
in articles 74 to 77.”116 Article 74 provides for the measure of damages for
breach of contract:
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, in-
cluding loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.




109. Id. at 433.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 WL 134078 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011).
113. Id. at *1.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 45(1)(b)).
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ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of
the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible
consequence of the breach of contract.117
Alternatively, Articles 75 and 76 deal with the measure of damages when a
contract is avoided.118 Which article applies often depends on whether the
non-breaching party covers.119 Article 75 provides:
If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable
time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has
resold the goods, the party claiming damages may recover the difference between
the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further
damages recoverable under article 74.120
By contrast Article 76 provides:
If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party claim-
ing damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under article 75, recover
the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the
time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74.121
The court stated that, if only a breach of contract is alleged, Article 74 is the
sole measure of damages.122 But where there is alleged avoidance, the CISG al-
lows for recovery under Articles 75 and 76, “as well as any further damages re-
coverable under article 74.”123 Semi-Materials alleged avoidance of the contract
by MEMC.124 Therefore, the court held that its expert should be allowed to pre-
sent evidence to support damages under both Article 74 and Article 76.125
LIMITATION-OF-REMEDIES CLAUSES
MSS, Inc. v. Maser Corp.126 concerned a limitation-of-remedies clause in a con-
tract between MSS, Inc. (“MSS”), a Tennessee corporation, and Maser Corp.
(“Maser”), a Delaware subsidiary of a Canadian corporation.127 MSS sued
Maser for breach of contract.128 Maser counterclaimed for breach of contract,
seeking consequential damages in the form of lost profits.129 MSS responded
to the counterclaim with a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion on the issue of con-
117. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 74).
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 75).
121. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 76(1)).
122. Id. (citing Macromex SRL v. Globex Int’l, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 114 (SAS), 2008 WL 1752530, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008)).
123. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, arts. 75, 76).
124. Id.
125. Id. at *4.
126. No. 3:09-cv-00601, 2011 WL 2938424 (M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011).
127. Id. at *1. The clause provided that MSS would not be responsible for consequential damages
arising out of the use or performance of recycle sorting machines that it sold to Maser. Id.
128. Id. at *2.
129. Id.
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sequential damages.130 At the crux of its Rule 12(b)(6) argument, MSS argued that
the parties’ damages clause prohibited recovery of consequential damages.131
The parties vigorously disputed whether the CISG or U.S. law applied.132 The
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found the CISG inapplic-
able because the CISG “governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the
rights and obligations of the seller and buyer arising from such a contract.”133
The “validity of the contract or of any of its provisions” is specifically excluded
from the CISG.134 Thus, the court held that the validity and enforceability of
contract provisions, such as damages limitations, is decided under domestic
law.135 The court held that the U.C.C. allows parties to prohibit recovery of
consequential damages.136
LOST PROFITS
In Al Hewar Environmental & Public Health Establishment v. Southeast Ranch,
LLC,137 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida addressed
a lost profits claim. Al Hewar Environmental and Public Health Establishment
(“Al Hewar”) was a United Arab Emirates entity that supplied the U.A.E. with
agricultural products.138 Southeast Ranch, LLC (“Southeast”) was a U.S. ranch-
ing and farming entity.139 Al Hewar contracted to purchase 5,000 tons of hay
from Southeast.140 At the same time, it contracted to sell the hay to the govern-
ment of Abu Dubai.141 The Abu Dubai contract required Al Hewar to arrange
a performance bond.142
Southeast failed to perform at all, causing Al Hewar to breach its contract with
Abu Dubai.143 Al Hewar thus lost its performance bond and the profits on the
Abu Dubai contract.144 It sued Southeast to recover for both.145 The court
looked to Article 74 of the CISG, which states:
130. Id.
131. Id. at *3.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 4).
134. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 4); see generally Jack Graves, Penalty Clauses and the
CISG, 30 J.L. & COM. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing that the validity of liquidated damages clauses
is not within the scope of the CISG).
135. Maser Corp., 2011 WL 2938424, at *3.
136. Id. at *6–7. Under the U.C.C., consequential damages “may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.” Id. at *6 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2011)). Maser was
unable to convince the court that this limitation was unconscionable under the U.C.C. Id. at *6–7.
MSS’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion was therefore granted. Id. at *7.
137. No. 10-80851-CV, 2011 WL 7191744 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2011).








International Sale of Goods 11
3058-141_13_Duhl-2pass-r03.3d Pages: [1–14] Date: [August 3, 2012] Time: [11:26]
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, in-
cluding loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.
Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or
ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light
of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a pos-
sible consequence of the breach of the contract.146
The court held that, at the time of contract formation, Southeast should have
foreseen that Al Hewar would resell the hay at a profit.147 Thus, an award of Al
Hewar’s lost profits was appropriate. It also held (but without explanation) that a
performance bond on the resale contract was foreseeable, and Al Hewar could
recover for the loss of the performance bond as well.148
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In ECEM European Chemical Marketing, B.V. v. Purolite Co.,149 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld an award of prejudgment interest in a CISG
case.150 ECEM European Chemical Marketing, B.V. argued that Article 78 of the
CISG prevented an award of prejudgment interest or, alternatively, that Pennsyl-
vania law precluded an award under the circumstances.151 The Purolite Company
countered that the CISG does not expressly preclude prejudgment interest and
application of Pennsylvania law allowed for such an award.152 Ultimately, it did
not matter whether Pennsylvania law or the CISG applied. If Pennsylvania law
applied, it provided for prejudgment interest.153 If the CISG applied, then the
dispute became a federal question.154 In such federal cases, district courts are al-
lowed broad discretion in determining whether prejudgment interest should be
awarded.155 Thus, the court held that prejudgment interest was available.156
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
In Semi-Materials Co. v. MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc.,157 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dealt with the applicability of equitable
146. Id. (quoting CISG, supra note 1, art. 74).
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id. at *2−3. The court also stated in dicta that the damages would have been the same under
Florida law (i.e., the U.C.C.). Id. at *3.
149. 451 F. App’x 73 (3d Cir. 2011).
150. Cf. Gregory M. Duhl, International Sale of Goods, 65 BUS. LAW. 1313, 1323 (2010) (“Courts
have split over whether parties can earn prejudgment interest from the time of an arbitral award
to the time of judgment under the CISG, but it is undisputed that the CISG provides that in the
event of non-payment or delayed payment in a breach of contract action, the other party is entitled
to prejudgment interest.” (citations omitted)).
151. ECEM, 451 F. App’x at 78−79.
152. Id. at 79.
153. Id. (citing Fernandez v. Levin, 548 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. 1988)).
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d 972, 981–82 (3d Cir.
1984)).
156. Id. at 80.
157. No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 WL 65919 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011).
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relief in CISG breach of contract actions. Semi-Materials Company, Ltd. (“Semi-
Materials”) sued MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. (“MEMC”) for, inter alia, res-
titution based on unjust enrichment.158 MEMC moved for summary judgment,
arguing equitable relief was not available under the CISG for breach of con-
tract.159 The court agreed, stating that the CISG provides exclusive remedies
for breach of contract.160 Thus, where the action is for breach of contract, equi-
table relief is not available.161 However, the court held that, because MEMC
affirmatively denied the existence of at least three of the contracts on which
Semi-Materials sued, the CISG did not preempt the unjust enrichment claims
in relation to those three “contracts.”162 Therefore, the court denied the defen-
dant’s summary judgment motion.163
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id. at *3.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09CV00318 SWW, 2009
WL 5181854, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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